the language, just as they did with the terms “jawhar” (substance), “ʿaraḍ” (accident), “wujūd” (existence), “dhāt” (essence), and the like. They thus employed the word “jism” for anything that subsists in its own right and can be physically pointed to in a variety of sensory ways.

They then entered into a rational dispute about the entities so indicated—air, fire, earth, water, and the rest—asking whether each is (1) composed of discrete, indivisible particles (jawāhir mufradah) that admit of no further division, or (2) made up of matter and form, or (3) not composite in either of these two senses. These three opinions have been treated at length elsewhere.

Now, whoever acknowledges that such entities are composed in either of those two ways is obliged—if he says, “Allah is a jism”—to hold that Allah is likewise a composite of that sort. Hence they declared this claim false and, on the basis of their own principles, considered it obligatory to deny whatever the name “jism” connotes; this is the position for which they are best known.

As for those who believe that these entities are not composite in either of the two ways, they say, “If I affirm that He is a jism, I would necessarily be asserting composition.” Among this latter group are some who nevertheless apply the term “jism” to Him, intending by it simply “that which exists independently” or “an existing thing,” just as others apply the word “jawhar,” saying, “By jawhar we mean that which subsists by itself.” In the same way they say: “Nothing exists except either a jawhar or an ʿaraḍ; for existence is either self-subsistent, which is the jawhar, or dependent on something else, which is the ʿaraḍ—and the jawhar is the nobler of the two.”