the simultaneous presence of two opposites in a single subject.

For the human will looks for food and drink, and desires to worship, fast, and pray, whereas the divine will precludes any wish for such things. The divine will is to create, provide sustenance, and govern the universe, while the human nature recoils from that will. Accordingly, if both wills and both aversions were to reside in one locus, the very substance described by both sets of attributes would have to be, at the same time, willing a thing, refraining from willing it, not willing it; hating a thing and yet not hating it—combining mutually exclusive predicates in several respects.

It is impossible for two decisive wills concerning a thing and its opposite, or two decisive aversions concerning a thing or its opposite, to subsist in one and the same subject; and no action occurs except through a firm will joined to power. As for the divinity, whatever He wills comes to be, and whatever He does not will does not occur; whenever He decisively wills something, He is able to bring about what He wills. The humanity, on the other hand, performs none of the acts characteristic of human beings until it likewise wills them with a firm will. Yet the humanity cannot will the will of the divinity and in fact detests it, so that one and the same being would be decisively willing a thing and able to do it, while simultaneously not decisively willing it and, indeed, being incapable of doing it.