and the other likewise is weakened, as is evident in every example of fusion: whenever one thing merges with another, each diminishes the strength of the other from what it formerly possessed.

Thus, when cold water is mixed with hot water, both the force of heat and the force of cold are reduced, and the resulting blend occupies a middle degree between pure coldness and pure heat.

The same applies to water with milk and to every other form of amalgamation.

Consequently, if such a union had truly taken place, the power, nature, and will of the Godhead would have to be altered from what they were, and the power, nature, and will of the manhood likewise diminished from their previous state; what would remain is a composite being made up of divinity and humanity. That necessarily entails a deficiency in the divinity compared to what it had been and the nullification of its perfection, just as it assigns to the humanity a perfection it never possessed.

Therefore, everything they attribute to the humanity on account of the divinity’s alleged union with it necessarily implies a loss in the divinity, a stripping away of the unique perfection that belongs to it alone, and the invalidation of its complete attributes—in proportion to what the divinity has acquired from that humanity through the union. Otherwise, if the divinity has remained just as it was, then no union in any sense has taken place; the humanity, too, remains exactly as it was. In that case the two are simply two: neither has fused with the other, nor have they become a single entity.

Moreover, if the substance were truly one, its will would have to be one and its nature one; for if there were two wills, the locus of one of them—assuming it is also the locus of the other—and the opposition entailed by the two wills would necessarily result in the simultaneous presence of