is the uttered word itself—his mistake is plain. Yet both groups have become confused about what is meant by the “name” and by the utterance itself.

Similarly, they have been bewildered about the very speech of the original speaker on whose behalf the words are transmitted—the speech intended by the transmitter’s recitation and writing—as opposed to the transmitter’s own voice and ink.

The difference between the two is obvious to any sound-minded person.

When a scribe writes the name of Allah on a sheet of paper and pronounces the name of Allah in his address, and someone then says, “I disbelieve in this and believe in that,” the understood meaning of his words is that he believes or disbelieves in the One denoted by the written and spoken name, not that he believes or disbelieves in a mere sound or blot of ink.

In the same way, when someone, referring to what he hears from the reciters or to what is written in the copies of the Quran, declares, “This is the speech of Allah,” or when, with regard to what he hears from transmitters of another person’s words or to what he finds in books, he says, “This is the speech of Zayd,” he is not speaking about that particular sound or ink; rather, he means the wording and meaning that Zayd conveyed with his own voice and that was later written on parchment with ink.

Therefore, if someone says about that, “It is created,” he has in effect said, “It is not the speech of Allah, and He did not speak it.”

If, however, a person is referring specifically to the sound or the ink and says, “It is created,” he is correct—just as one who, intending only the sound or the script, says, “This is not the speech of Allah; rather, it is created,” is also correct. Nevertheless, he must clarify his intent with language that leaves no room for ambiguity.