are two substances, two hypostases: she bore one of them but did not bear the other—just as the Melkites, along with them, affirm that one of the two was crucified while the other was not, that one died while the other did not, and that one suffered while the other did not.

How, then, can the Melkites permit, at the time of death, that death, crucifixion, eating, drinking, and all other human traits befall one of the two substances to the exclusion of the other, yet refuse—at the moment of birth—to allow Mary to give birth to one substance without the other? Is this not a contradiction on their part?

The same inconsistency appears in their unanimous claim: “He ascended to heaven and sat at the right hand of his Father,” while also insisting that the divine nature, together with the human nature, sat at the Father’s right hand. Yet they go on to say that the divinity seated at the right hand of the other is that very other, and that the two constitute one substance and one God, all while professing that he is “true God from true God.” Their contradictions are indeed many.

There is no doubt that the Nestorians’ position is also self-contradictory, but the Melkite doctrine cannot be vindicated without first vindicating theirs; in fact, the Melkite creed is even more corrupt and more internally inconsistent.

The Nestorians say: God was neither born nor crucified. The Jacobites say: He was born and was crucified. The Melkites say: He was born but was not crucified. Yet once it is conceded that he could be born, it must likewise be conceded that he could die and be crucified; and if it is impossible that he be crucified and die, then it is equally impossible that he be born.