Fourth point:
These misguided folk were not satisfied with claiming that the Lord of the heavens and the earth united with a human being in the womb of a woman and took that womb as His residence. They then allege that the vilest of God’s creation seized Him, spat in His face, pressed thorns upon His head, and crucified Him between two thieves—while, according to them, He was at that very moment imploring God for help, saying:

“My God, My God, why have You forsaken me?”

Yet they insist that the voice people heard was the lāhūt (divine nature), just as Moses heard the speech of God from the bush. They maintain that the two natures are a single person, and some of them add that the two share one will and one nature.

Now speech occurs only by the will of the speaker; consequently, the one speaking, pleading, seeking aid, and being crucified must, by their own reasoning, be the lāhūt itself—at once the supplicant beseeching help and the very One from whom help is sought.

Moreover, they claim that the lāhūt and the nāsūt (human nature) are one person. If they are indeed one, that person must be either the petitioner or the One petitioned, either the caller or the called. Should they say that the caller is other than the one called, they have admitted the existence of two, not one; but if they persist in saying they are one, then the caller and the called are necessarily identical.

Fifth point:
One may say to them: there are only two possibilities. Either they assert that the lāhūt was able to ward them off from His nāsūt, or they claim that He was not. If they say He was not able, it follows that those Jews were more powerful than the Lord of the worlds,