must be believed, because he is a prophet; and whoever denies him is an unbeliever for that very reason. Accordingly, one is obliged to believe every prophet, and to deem anyone who belies him an unbeliever.

Fourth:
Grant, for the sake of argument, that there is no proof establishing such indwelling in anyone else; still, one must at least concede its possibility in others, since nothing proves its impossibility. They themselves say that this union existed in the Messiah before he displayed his miracles, as they claim. Consequently, they are forced to allow that Allah could have made every prophet a perfect god and a perfect man, like the Messiah, even if this is unknown.

Fifth:
Even if it never actually occurred, they nonetheless hold it to be possible, for there is no difference in Allah’s power between His uniting with the Messiah and His uniting with any other human being. Hence they must allow that Allah could make every person both a perfect god and a perfect man, each individual becoming a composite of divinity and humanity. A doctrine approaching this false consequence is that of those who say that the souls of the children of Adam are part of Allah’s very essence, that they are an eternal, primordial divinity. Such people make half of every human being divine and the other half human. In some respects the absurdities that follow for them are even greater than those that follow for the Christians, though in other respects the impossibilities incumbent upon the Christians are more numerous.

The second rebuttal:
They say, “It does not follow from our statement that this amounts to worshipping three gods; rather—”