the accidental that necessarily accompanies the subject—is a baseless distinction. They have proposed three differences, each of them unsound, as was noted earlier: (1) the so-called “middle term”; (2) the claim that the essential attribute is prior both in conception and in concrete existence, unlike the necessary accidental; and (3) the assertion that the very reality of the thing depends upon the essence. The futility of all this has been demonstrated elsewhere.

Moreover, what the Christians mean by “substantial” is not what these thinkers intend by “essential,” and for that reason we have not expanded the discussion. The Christians simply say that the Three are “substances.” The logicians, however, distinguish between what is necessary to the quiddity and what is necessary to the existence of a thing, building this on the assumption that outside the mind there are two separate realities: existence, and a quiddity other than existence. This entire issue has been dealt with at length in another place.

Granted, even if we supposed that a subject’s necessary attributes divide into constitutive essentials and necessary accidentals, and that the attributes of the Lord—exalted be He—are likewise, there would be no reason to single out knowledge as an essential attribute rather than power. Saying “a self-subsistent, living, knowing Being” is no more justified than saying “a self-subsistent, living, powerful Being.”

Since the Christians maintain that the hypostases are three, and claim that the revealed law bears witness to this—while in making that claim they are actually contradicting the very scripture sent down to them—