by them; thus an inanimate object is more deficient than a living being that has not yet acquired its full attributes of perfection. Yet if the being in question is capable of those attributes, then whenever it lacks them it must necessarily be described by their opposites.

These people might say, “Affirming such attributes for Him amounts to likening Him to living creatures.” The answer is: negating the attributes, on the other hand, likens Him to inanimate matter, which is even more deficient than living creatures. Therefore, if negating the attributes is not considered a likeness to inert matter, then, by the same token, affirming them should not be considered a likeness to living creatures. Conversely, if resemblance to living creatures is deemed objectionable, then resemblance to inanimate objects is even more objectionable; and if the latter resemblance is not regarded as blameworthy, it is even less fitting to regard the former as blameworthy.

Second response: Their refusal to describe inanimate objects as dead, deaf, or mute on the pretext that such objects are not receptive to those states is a purely terminological choice. In Allah’s own speech inanimate objects are nevertheless called “dead,” as He, exalted be He, says about the idols: “Dead, lifeless things” (Qur’an 16:21).

Third response: The mere absence of these attributes—life, knowledge, and power—is itself a deficiency, whether the entity in question is assumed to be receptive to them or not. Indeed, if it is presumed to be incapable of them, that only makes the deficiency more blatant.

Hence it is clear that denying these attributes of Him—and denying His capacity for them—necessarily entails that He is more deficient than a blind and deaf animal that is at least capable of them, even though it does not actually possess them.

Fourth response: Perfection lies in existence, while deficiency lies in non-existence; thus, the very