Some atheists among the philosophers and those who follow them raise a well-known objection here. They argue that one is obliged to ascribe the opposite qualities only when the being in question, having failed to possess the attributes of perfection, is in fact capable of them; but if the being is not capable of such attributes, the obligation does not arise.

They say: “These attributes are contraries that fall under the category of ʿadam wa-malaka (privation versus possession)—that is, the absence of a quality in something whose nature allows it, such as the absence of life, hearing, or sight. The discussion, therefore, pertains to the living creature, for it alone is receptive to these attributes. If the entity is not receptive, like an inanimate object, then although it lacks life, hearing, sight, and speech, we do not call it dead, deaf, blind, or mute.”

The reply to this can be given from several angles. One of them is as follows: The being in question is either capable of possessing the attributes of perfection or it is not. If it is incapable, it is necessarily inferior to the one that is capable, and it is not characterized