contrary to the basic linguistic principle, and that whenever a single term is found in several contexts, it is preferable to regard it as one proper word applied to each case on account of a common element, rather than to treat it as a verbal homonym, literal in this particular sense, or figurative in one of the two senses—for both metaphor and homonymy run counter to the default rule. This would still hold even were we to concede that the words “son” and “Holy Spirit” had ever been employed for Allah’s speech and life, as the Christians claim. How much stronger, then, is the argument when no prophetic utterance can be produced in which the prophets used the expressions “son” or “Holy Spirit” intending thereby any of Allah’s attributes—neither His speech, nor His life, nor His knowledge, nor anything else. In the language of the prophets, the word “son” is applied only to a created being, and “Holy Spirit” is never used for one of Allah’s inherent attributes.

Accordingly, when we explain “son” as the sonship of nurture and “Holy Spirit” as the spirit that descends upon the prophets, we have preserved the word as a single, univocal term. They, however, are compelled to treat it as homonymous, or at best figurative, in one of its two senses. Their interpretation therefore conflicts with the plain sense of the language in which they were addressed and with the manifest meaning of the scriptures they hold, whereas our interpretation accords with both. It is thus evident that the Trinity enjoys neither scriptural nor rational support; indeed, it is invalid according to both revelation and reason.

This is further corroborated by the seventh consideration: namely, that in their Creed they have affirmed