in its divinity. And if the divine nature could remain united with the Messiah’s human nature for a lengthy period, why should it be impossible for that same divine nature to be joined to Mary’s human nature for a brief moment? And if the human nature to which she gave birth is deemed the son of the divine nature, on what grounds is she herself not considered the divine nature’s companion and spouse? For, in their view, the term “Messiah” designates the composite of divinity and humanity; he is, according to them, both a perfect god and a perfect man—his divinity being from God and his humanity from Mary.

Thus he proceeds from two sources: a divine source and a human source. If one of those sources is his father and the other his mother, why, on that basis, is his mother not regarded as the wife of his father, especially since companionship precedes the begetting of offspring? How, then, can the contingent branch be affirmed while the necessary root is denied?

Nothing in this, on their own principles, is any more impossible than their assertion of the Messiah’s sonship—indeed, it is even less so. And even if the Messiah—peace be upon him—did utter these words, we know that he and the other prophets are divinely protected and speak nothing but the truth; therefore, whatever they say must necessarily bear a sound meaning. It is inconceivable that they should intend by their words something whose falsity is self-evident to hearing or reason.

Accordingly, when reason, the texts of the earlier scriptures, and the Qur’anic passages all contradict what the Christians have innovated concerning the Messiah, it becomes clear that the Messiah never intended a false meaning that conflicts with plain reason and authentic revelation.

Rather, we say in the fifth response: if this wording is indeed authentically attributable to the Messiah