—the lām is doubled—and the word itself is well-known.
His statement “fa-yushrishiru” means: he cuts it into pieces.
The expression “ḍawḍawū,” spelled with two dotted ḍāds, means: they clamoured.
The phrase “fa-yafgharu,” with a fā and a dotted ghayn, means: he opens.
The word “al-marāh,” with a fatḥah on the mīm, means: the spectacle.
The verb “yaḥushshu-hā,” pronounced with a fatḥah on the yā, a ḍamma on the un-dotted ḥā, and a dotted shīn, means: he kindles it.
The phrase “rawḍatun muʿtammatun,” with a ḍamma on the mīm, a sukūn on the ʿayn, a fatḥah on the tā and a doubled mīm, describes a meadow abounding in tall, luxuriant vegetation.
The term “dawḥah,” with an open dāl, a silent wāw and an un-dotted ḥā, denotes a large tree.
“Al-maḥḍ,” with a fatḥah on the mīm, a sukūn on the ḥā and a dotted ḍād, is pure milk.
The phrase “fa-samā baṣarī” means: my sight rose upward; and “ṣuʿudan,” with a ḍamma on the ṣād and the ʿayn, means: upward.
The word “al-ribābah,” with an open rāʾ and a doubled bāʾ, signifies: a cloud.

261 – Chapter: Clarifying the kinds of lying that are permissible

Know that lying, though fundamentally forbidden, may in certain situations be allowed under conditions that I have detailed in my book al-Adhkār. In summary: speech is a means to attain objectives. Whenever a praiseworthy objective can be achieved without lying, then lying remains unlawful; but if that objective cannot be reached except through lying, lying becomes permissible. If the objective sought is itself merely permissible, the lie is likewise permissible; if the objective is obligatory, the lie becomes obligatory.

Hence, if a Muslim is in hiding from an oppressor who wants to kill him or seize his property and someone is asked about his whereabouts, it is obligatory to lie in order to conceal him. The same ruling applies when a person holds a deposit and an oppressor tries to confiscate it: it is obligatory to lie so as to keep it hidden.

The safer course in all such cases is to use tawriyah (equivocation), meaning that the speaker intends by his words a sound meaning, so that with respect to his own intention he is not lying, even though the outward wording—and what the listener understands—constitutes a lie. If, however, he abandons equivocation and simply states the lie outright, that is not unlawful in this situation.