and by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Bukhārī in Kashf al-Asrār, al-Fatūḥī in his commentary on al-Kawkab al-Munīr, and al-ʿAṭṭār in his marginal notes on al-Jalāl al-Maḥallī.

Al-Shinqīṭī, in his Mudhakkirah, restricted it to purely religious matters.

Al-Ghazālī states in al-Mustasfā (p. 137): “Al-Naẓẓām held that ijmāʿ is every statement for which proof has been established—even if uttered by a single individual—which runs counter to both language and customary usage.”

I say: Muḥibbullāh remarks in Musallam al-Thubūt (2/211): “Some of the Naẓẓāmiyya and certain Shiʿites maintained that ijmāʿ is impossible. More than one author attributed this to al-Naẓẓām himself, yet al-Subkī observes that it is merely the view of some of his followers; as for al-Naẓẓām, he deemed ijmāʿ conceivable but devoid of evidentiary force.”

I add: The Khārijites likewise denied the authority of ijmāʿ, as mentioned in al-Iḥkām (1/183), and a faction of the Murjiʾa did the same, for al-Maswadah (2/615) relates that they consider it possible for the whole community to agree upon error.

– Is the authority of ijmāʿ definitive (qaṭʿī) or merely presumptive (ẓannī)?

A concise survey of the views on this question is provided by al-Zarkashī in al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ (6/389, 388) and by al-Shawkānī in Irshād al-Fuḥūl (p. 144).

Al-Zarkashī writes: “Section Six: On whether it is a conclusive proof. Al-Ruwayānī says in al-Baḥr: When an ijmāʿ is established upon one of its evidences, does that evidence become certain? There are two opinions. The first affirms this, so that the proof may stand firm. The second denies it, arguing from the fallibility of each individual scholar, which would apply to them collectively as well. A number of uṣūl scholars have declared without qualification that ijmāʿ is a decisive proof; among them are al-Ṣayrafī and Ibn Burhān, and, from the Ḥanafīs, al-Dabūsī and Shams al-Aʾimmah, who said this is an honor granted to this ummah. Al-Iṣfahānī considered it the prevalent position, holding that ijmāʿ takes precedence over all other proofs and that no evidence can oppose it, attributing this to the majority; he added that anyone who rejects it is deemed an unbeliever, or at least misguided and an innovator. In contrast, Imām al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī held that it yields only conjecture. The sound view is to distinguish: whatever the recognized authorities have unanimously agreed upon is a definitive proof, whereas matters such as the tacit ijmāʿ, or cases where we do not even know of a dissenter, constitute only a presumptive proof