and other variants that emerged from the differing views of the jurists of Kūfa and Basra, so long as the person concerned is himself a qualified jurist. By contrast, if someone says, “The Khaṭṭābiyya and the Rāfiḍa have stated such-and-such,” no heed is paid to them in matters of jurisprudence, for they do not belong to its people.

Ibn al-Qaṭṭān said: “Consensus, in our view, is the consensus of the scholars. Anyone driven by sectarian passion has no share in it.” He went on: “Our companions maintain that the Khārijites have no standing whatever—neither in the formation of consensus nor in dissent—because they possess no recognised authority to which they can trace their positions, having declared our predecessors, from whom we received the foundations of the religion, to be unbelievers.” End quote.

Among those who adopted the view that such people are not counted are, from the Ḥanafī school, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and from the Ḥanbalī school, Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, who inferred it from Aḥmad’s statement, “A man whose uprightness is not established with me may not testify before me; how, then, could I endorse his judgment?” The judge explained that Aḥmad was speaking about a Jahmī.

A third view holds that ijmāʿ cannot rest upon the innovator himself, but can be established without him. That is, he may depart from the rest in accordance with his own ijtihād, yet no one else may adopt his view by way of imitation. Al-Āmidī reported this position and later scholars followed him; some criticised him, saying, “I think he was merely transmitting someone else’s opinion.” In fact, the view clarifies the two earlier opinions and refuses to leave them unqualified, for two agreed-upon principles in the chapters of ijtihād and taqlīd rule out such absoluteness.

1. The jurists agree that, after exercising ijtihād, a mujtahid is forbidden to practise taqlīd and must act on what his own ijtihād yields; to say here that he must act on a contrary opinion infringes that consensus.
2. They likewise agree that a layman may follow one known for knowledge and integrity and is forbidden to follow one known for the opposite. Once this is established, the two earlier statements cannot stand unrestricted. It therefore becomes clear that when some said, “Consensus cannot be concluded without him,” they meant with respect to himself; and when others said, “It can be concluded,” they meant with respect to everyone else. The disagreement is therefore merely verbal. The statement must be interpreted in this way, for otherwise it is problematic.

A fourth view distinguishes between the innovator who actively calls others to his innovation—whose opinion is not counted—and one who does not publicise it—whose opinion is taken into account. Ibn Ḥazm reports this in al-Iḥkām, attributing it to the majority of their early authorities among the hadith scholars, and then comments: “It is an unsound view, for what matters is the creed itself.” End quote.