(1) Ibn Qudama states in al-Mughni (5/399): “The legal form of an *umra* is that a person says, ‘I grant you lifelong possession of this house,’ or ‘It is yours for as long as you live,’ or ‘for the duration of your life,’ and the like. It is called *umra* because the gift is restricted to the lifetime (*‘umur*) of the beneficiary. A *ruqba* is when someone says, ‘I place this house at your disposal during your life on the condition that, if you die before me, it reverts to me, but if I die before you, it becomes yours and your descendants’.’ It is as though he were saying, ‘It belongs to whichever of us dies last.’ The term *ruqba* derives from each party ‘watching’ (*yarqubu*) for the death of the other. According to the majority of scholars, both forms are legally valid.” (2) The “consensus” mentioned here means only that most scholars hold this view; in fact the issue involves detailed and significant disagreement. Al-Suyuti records in al-Ashbah wa-n-naza’ir (p. 195), citing al-Nawawi: “One remaining case is when the conditional formula is uttered without intending either an obligation or a pure suspension, but is used in the manner of an oath. In this situation the majority of our jurists report two opinions. The authors of al-Muhadhdhab, al-Intisar, and al-Rafi‘i favour no violation and no occurrence of divorce. Our teacher Ibn al-Salah, however, held that divorce does in fact occur, arguing that this is the position of most scholars and that the literal wording of the condition is general. Still, the contextual indication of urging or forbidding can qualify (and thus limit) that generality, albeit with some weakness; hence the author of al-Hawi and others remained undecided. What strengthens this qualification is the combination of the contextual clue of urging or forbidding with a specific intention to urge or forbid. This is the view we have adopted. Usually, when someone swears concerning a future act of another party whom he thinks can be deterred, he intends to urge or forbid, and we likewise hold that his divorce does not take effect if the act occurs through ignorance or forgetfulness—unless he explicitly dismisses the idea of urging or forbidding and intends a pure suspension, in which case divorce takes effect whenever the act is performed. As for someone who swears regarding his own conduct, divorce is not prevented by ignorance or forgetfulness unless he intended urging or forbidding.”