repels what is definitively and specifically known, so it is nothing but a false, sophistical claim—its intellectual invalidity is perfectly clear.

If you adopt the method of formal disputation, say to your opponent: Whatever answer you produced when someone argued for the existence of two beings, one necessary and the other contingent, is the very same answer to anyone who argues for two beings both of which are necessary. Now, if the proof they employ to establish their doctrine of divine oneness entails denying the Necessary Being, it becomes evident that their monotheism itself leads to the denial of the Necessary Being—exactly as we noted at the beginning of this reply. They first affirmed a Necessary Being, then assigned to Him concomitants whose implications negate Him.

Moreover, this very proof also entails the falsity of claiming two beings, one necessary in itself and the other necessary through something else.

It is a truth they themselves concede—indeed, one supported by conclusive demonstration—that existence must contain (1) a being whose existence is necessary in and of itself and (2) a being whose existence is necessary through another. Existence as such calls for a self-subsisting being, whereas these contingent events are necessary through something else: if their complete cause is absent, their existence is impossible; once the universal cause is present, their non-existence is impossible, for a complete cause is never divorced from its effect. This is decisively proven, and they acknowledge it—indeed, it is among the soundest of their own statements.

That being so, we say: These two necessary beings—the one necessary in itself and the other necessary through another—share the designation “necessity,” yet each is distinguished from the other in that this one is necessary in itself whereas that one is necessary through another. They therefore agree in one respect and differ in another, and the fourfold divisions they themselves articulated revert once more.

If it is then said: The common element is consequent upon the differentiating attribute, this would mean that the differentiating attribute—namely, being necessary in itself or through another—is the cause of necessity, and a cause must, by definition, precede its effect. It would therefore follow that a necessity—whether in itself or through another—exists prior to