or be an unconditioned universal that encompasses others. Now, if by the essence of this man you actually mean this very man, then every determinate individual is a man by his own determinate essence, just as he is a man by his own determinate humanity; neither of these determinate factors is shared between him and anyone else. Indeed, all the concrete substances and attributes that belong to him are exclusive to him and are not shared with anyone else. Each person, by virtue of his own particular essence and all of his particular attributes that pertain to him and through which he exists, can exist whether or not the other person’s particular essence exists, and whether or not the other person’s attributes exist.

If, however, you suppose that Zayd’s essence is itself a particular essence matching him in specificity, then although that supposition is false, it does not harm our present argument; for if someone were to say that the determinate humanity is known to be an effect of that determinate essence, that would pose no problem.

But if you are asked, “By his essence do you mean an absolute, shared essence—for example, absolute humanity?” the reply is: Such an essence has no existence outside the mind, because the very condition of being “absolute” prevents it from existing extra-mentally. Universals are universals only in the mind; outside the mind they exist solely as determinate instances. Hence, in external reality there is no such thing as “man” or “animal” or the like apart from concrete individuals. Therefore, when you say, “The universal is established in particulars,” or “the absolute exists,” and you mean that its existence is nothing other than the existence of concrete individuals, that is a correct meaning. If, on the other hand, you intend that it exists as a universal in absolute fashion, that is false.

And if you say, “What we mean is that it exists absolutely, without the condition of absoluteness, and we do not thereby intend that it be either universal or particular (1),” we answer: Your claim that it exists “without the condition of absoluteness” does not preclude its being only determinate, for outside the mind it exists only as determinate. When you conceive of it as absolute—without the condition of absoluteness and without determination—that conception exists solely in the mind. Just as it exists only in the mind when conditioned by absoluteness, so when can it ever be detached from