His essence alone; but knowing that He is a source adds something to the bare knowledge of existence, for the notion of “source” introduces a relation to the essence. It is perfectly possible to know the essence while remaining unaware of that relation, and were “source” not a relational attribute it would multiply the essence, so that He would possess both existence and sourcehood—two distinct items—just as a human being may know his own essence yet remain ignorant that he is an effect until he learns it, for being an effect is a relation to its cause. Likewise, being a cause is a relation to the effect. The objection therefore stands the very moment they say, “He knows Himself as a source,” because the claim entails knowledge of the essence and knowledge of its sourcehood, and that sourcehood is a relation. Relation is other than essence; hence knowledge of the relation is other than knowledge of the essence, by the argument we have set forth, namely, that one can imagine knowledge of the essence without knowledge of its sourcehood, whereas one cannot (1) imagine knowledge of the essence without knowledge of the essence itself, for the essence is one.
Second: Their statement that “the Whole is known to Him only by secondary intention” is meaningless. If His knowledge encompasses what is other than Himself just as it encompasses His own essence, then there are two distinct objects known and He possesses knowledge of both. The plurality and distinctness of the knowables necessarily entail a plurality of acts of knowledge, for the mind can conceive one of the two as exceeding the other, and thus the knowledge of one cannot be identical to the knowledge of the other. Were they the same, it would be impossible even to posit the existence of one without the other—something conceivable only if everything were literally one, which it is not. Calling this a “secondary intention” changes nothing.
Indeed, how can someone who insists that “Not even the weight of an atom, in the heavens or on the earth, escapes His knowledge” still deny multiplicity? He maintains that the entire cosmos is known to Him only as an undifferentiated universal, while the universals encompassed by His knowledge are without limit. How, then, can the knowledge that relates to that countless and mutually distinct multitude be absolutely one in every respect?