Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-Falasifa - Ibn Taimiya - (69)

Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-FalasifaIbn Taimiya

would entail multiplicity, for were these attributes to arise within us we would know that they are something additional to the essence, since they are delimited. Even if one supposed them to accompany our very existence without any temporal delay, their mere concomitance would not remove them from being additional to the essence; whenever two things appear such that one supervenes upon the other, the mind recognises that this is not that, and even when they are concomitant the intellect still judges them to be two. Therefore, these attributes, even were they concomitant with the First’s very essence, would not cease to be other than the essence; this, they say, would introduce multiplicity into the Necessary Being, and that is impossible. For this reason they unanimously denied the attributes.

It is therefore said to them: How did you come to know the impossibility of multiplicity on this ground, when—apart from the Muʿtazilites—you differ from the entire community of Muslims in the proof you give for it? To say, “Multiplicity is impossible with respect to the Necessary Being while the described essence is one,” simply reduces to claiming that a plurality of attributes is impossible; that is precisely what is under dispute, and its impossibility is not self-evident, so it requires proof. They proceed along two paths.

The first is their statement: The demonstration is that, whenever the attribute and the one described are such that this is not that and that is not this,(1) one of three cases must obtain: either each of the two exists independently of the other, or each needs the other, or one is independent while the other is dependent. If it is assumed that each is independent of the other, then both are Necessary Beings, which would amount to absolute duality—an impossibility. If each of them needs the other, then neither is a Necessary Being, for the meaning of “Necessary Being” is that its subsistence lies in itself and that it is, in every respect, free of all else. Whatever depends on another has that other as its cause; if that other were removed, its own existence would be impossible, so its existence would not be from itself but from something else. If

(1) The manuscript reads idh (“when”), yet the version adopted here is probably the correct one.

يوجِبُ كثرةً؛ لأنَّ هذهِ الصِّفاتِ لو طرأَتْ علينا لكُنّا نَعلمُ أنَّها زائدةٌ على الذَّاتِ؛ إذْ تحدَّدَتْ، ولو قُدّرت مقارِنةً لوجودِنا مِنْ غيرِ تأخُّرٍ لَما خرجَ عَنْ كونِهِ زائدًا على الذَّاتِ بالمقارَنة، وكُلُّ شيئينِ إذا طرأَ أحدُهما على الآخرِ عُلِمَ أنَّ هذا ليسَ ذلكَ، فلو اقتَرَنا أيضًا عقلَ كونُهما شيئين، فإذًا لا تخرج عَنْ هذهِ الصِّفاتِ بأنْ تكونَ مقارنةً لذاتِ الأوَّلِ عَنْ أنْ تَكونَ شيئًا سِوى الذّات، فيُوجِب ذلكَ كثرةً في واجبِ الوجود، وهوَ مُحالٌ، فلِهذا أجمعوا على نفيِ الصِّفات، فيُقالُ لهم: وبِمَ عرفتُم استحالةَ الكثرةِ مِنْ هذا الوجهِ وأنتُم مخالِفونَ لكافّةِ المسلمينَ سوى المعتزلةِ في البرهانِ عليهِ؟ فإنَّ قولَ القائلِ: الكثرةُ مُحالٌ في واجبِ الوجودِ مَع كونِ الذّاتِ الموصوفةِ واحدةً ترجعُ إلى أنَّهُ مستحيلٌ كثرةُ الصِّفات، وفيهِ النِّزاعُ، وليسَ استحاله معلومًا بالضرورة، فلا بُدَّ مِنَ البرهان، ولهم مسلَكانِ: الأوَّلُ: قولُهم: البرهانُ عليهِ أنَّ كُلَّ واحدٍ مِنَ الصِّفةِ والموصوفِ إذا (١) لم يكُنْ هذا ذاكَ ولا ذاكَ هذا، فإمّا أنْ يستغنيَ كُلُّ واحدٍ عَنِ الآخرِ في وجودِه، أو يفتقرَ كُلُّ واحدٍ إلى الآخر، أو يستغنيَ واحدٌ عَنِ الآخر، ويحتاجَ الآخرَ، فإنْ فُرضَ كُلُّ واحدٍ مستغنيًا عَنِ الآخر فهُما واجبًا الوجود، وهيَ التَّثنيةُ المطلَقةُ، وهوَ مُحالٌ، وإمّا أنْ يحتاجَ كُلَّ منهُما إلى الآخرِ فلا يكونُ كُلُّ واحدٍ منهُما واجبَ الوجودِ؛ إذْ معنى واجبِ الوجودِ ما قوامُهُ بذاتِه، وهوَ مستغنٍ مِنْ كُلِّ وجهٍ عَنْ غيرِه، فما احتاجَ إلى غيرِهِ فذلكَ الغيرُ عِلَّتُهُ، إذْ لو رُفِعَ ذلكَ الغيرُ لامتنعَ وجودُهُ، فلا يكونُ وجودُهُ مِنْ ذاتِه، بَلْ مِنْ غيرِه، وإنْ

(١) في المخطوط (إذ) ولعلَّ المثبت هو الصحيح.