Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-Falasifa - Ibn Taimiya - (67)

Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-FalasifaIbn Taimiya

and he went on to expose their inability to furnish a proof for the impossibility of two deities, and their failure to establish that the First is not a body. Likewise, he demonstrated the futility of their doctrine of denying the attributes, invalidated their claim that the Essence of the First cannot be analysed into genus and differentia, and refuted their position that the First is a simple existent devoid of any quiddity. Admittedly, a thorough rebuttal of their views and a full disclosure of their unsoundness would require more than what Abū Ḥāmid presented; and although, in certain settings, they complain that he did not treat them fairly in debate, and he himself occasionally concurs with them on some faulty premises, he nevertheless excelled in refuting them on most of these questions, and what he presented in exposing the falsehood of their position is a lesson for all people of insight.

The point at issue here is this: demonstrative proof has established that the Being whose very reality is necessary existence cannot, in itself, accept either existence or non-existence; rather, His essence is necessary and in no way admits annihilation. Consequently, He can have neither an agent nor an efficient cause, nor any concomitant that is independent of Him; for any concomitant that adheres to something of which it has no need would have its own existence dependent on that thing, and if it were truly independent of it, its existence would still be conditioned by what is independent of it. In such a case, necessity would not belong to the thing by virtue of itself; it would stand in need of that from which it claims independence.

As for the concomitants that depend on Him, His necessary existence is not incompatible with them—whether they are called attributes, parts, causes, conditions, or any other name—for since they exist only through the existence of the Necessary Existent, His necessary existence cannot be deemed merely possible, susceptible to both being and non-being; rather, His necessary existence itself entails all of this, and this

( ) According to one reading, the name is pronounced with a doubled z, while another reading renders it “to Ghazala,” a village near Tus. He died in 505 AH/1111 CE. See: Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-Ayan, 1:463; Khayr al-Din al-Zirkali, al-A‛lam, 7:22.

وتكلَّمَ في تعجُّزِهم عَنْ إقامةِ الدَّليلِ على استحالةِ إلهَيْنِ وتعجيزِهم عَنْ بيانِ أنَّ الأوَّلَ ليسَ بجسمٍ، كما بيَّنَ بُطلانَ مذهبِهم في نفيِ الصِّفاتِ وإبطالِ قولِهم: إنَّ ذاتَ الأوَّلِ لا تنقسمُ بالجِنسِ والفَصل، وإبطالَ مذهبِهم في أنَّ الأوَّلَ موجودٌ بسيطٌ بلا ماهيّةٍ، مَع أنَّ الرَّدَّ عليهم وبيانَ فسادِ قولِهم يَحتملُ أكثرَ ما ذَكرَهُ أبو حامدٍ، وإنْ كانوا في بعضِ المواقفِ يقولونَ: إنَّهُ لم يُنصِفْهم في المناظَرةِ كما أنَّهُ في مواضعَ قد يوافقُهم على أُصولٍ باطلةٍ لكنَّهُ قد أحسنَ في الرَّدِّ عليهم في أكثرِ هذهِ المسائل، وبيَّنَ بما ذَكرَهُ مِنْ فسادِ قولِهم ما فيهِ عبرةٌ لأُولي الألبابِ. والمقصودُ هنا أنَّ الذي ثبتَ بالبُرهانِ أنَّهُ ليسَ بمُمكنٍ تقبُّلُ الوجودِ والعدَمِ بذاتِه، بَل نفسُهُ واجبةُ الوجودِ لا تقبَلُ العدمَ بوجهٍ مِنَ الوجوه، فلا يكونُ لهُ فاعلٌ ولا عِلّةٌ فاعلةٌ، ولما لازم لها مستغنٍ عنهُ؛ فإنَّ اللَّازمَ على المستغنَى عنهُ يكونُ وجودُهُ موقوفًا عليه، فإذا كانَ مستغنيًا عنهُ كانَ وجودُهُ موقوفًا على ما هوَ مستغنٍ عنهُ، فلا يكونُ وجوبٌ بمجرَّدِ نفسِه، بَلْ لا بدَّ لهُ مِنْ ذلكَ الغَنيِّ عنهُ. وأمّا اللَّوازمُ المفتقِرةُ إليهِ فوجوبُ وجودِهِ لا يُنافيها، سواءٌ سُمِّيَتْ صفاتٍ أو أجزاءً أو عِلَلًا أو شروطًا أو غيرَ ذلكَ مِنَ الأسماءِ؛ فإنَّها إذا كانَتْ لا توجدُ إلّا بوجودِ الواجبِ لم يكُنِ الوجودُ الواجب بنفسِهِ ممكنًا يقبلُ الوجودَ والعدَمَ، بَلْ كانَ الوجودُ الواجبُ هوَ المقتضي لهذا كُلِّه، وهذا

= من يقوله بتشديد الزاي) أو إلى غَزَالة (من قُرى طوس) لمن قال بالتخفيف. توفي سنة (٥٠٥ هـ). انظر: وفيات الأعيان (١/ ٤٦٣)، والأعلام للزركلي (٧/ ٢٢).