And since the existence of a given thing does not entail the existence of anything broader than itself, it is impermissible to treat the determinate particular (1) as necessitating the absolutely common universal that is wider than it. Nor does the element shared by two things—one of the unrestricted universals—follow from what is peculiar to each of them. Rather, what is peculiar to one of them entails only what is peculiar to that same one: its particular humanness entails its particular animality. And what they share entails only what they share: the shared humanness entails the shared animality. Indeed, the absolutely common universal, taken on the condition of absoluteness, can in no way be a necessary consequence of the determinate particular, nor its necessitant, concomitant, or subject. Thus the very basis of the argument collapses.

As for the claim that “the particular entails the particular,” such that its determinate existence necessitates its determinate necessity, its determinate quiddity, and the like—this avails him nothing. His proof is built on the premise that between the two there is a common element and a distinguishing element, and that one of them must belong to one of these four divisions. This is invalid; for if one were to argue that a particular can neither necessitate nor be necessitated by another particular, that would amount to denying the Necessary Being altogether—and that is self-evidently false, since the existence we observe entails a Necessary Being. He only meant to deny a plurality of Necessary Beings, not to deny the Necessary Being’s existence; and this argument fails to secure his objective.

The second reply is as follows. The questioner says: “If we had two Necessary Beings, one of them would either differ from the other or not.” We answer him: They must, of necessity, differ. He then says: “If one differs from the other, the four possibilities return: either …"