and this very universal remains concomitant with those other universals. Yet, on close examination, the genus—considered on the proviso that it is broader than the species—is not a necessary consequence of the species’ existence. All that necessarily accompanies the species is the genus taken absolutely, and such a genus need not be wider than the species, just as the species, in turn, accompanies the individual. What is entailed in each case is “the absolute—without the condition of absoluteness.” Hence the logicians say: “the individual’s share of the species, and the species’ share of the genus.” Thus, the existence of a concrete particular entails only the existence of a certain share of the absolute, namely the absolute without its being taken as absolute; it does not entail something more general than itself.

The species that exist outside the mind are nothing but determinate individuals; no unrestricted genus more comprehensive than they, nor even a broader species, is entailed by their existence. The unrestricted genus or species, precisely because it is taken with the condition of absoluteness, has its seat solely in the mind. Therefore, the presence of concrete particulars in extramental reality does not require the presence of free-standing universals in that same reality. What follows from the existence of an individual is merely the genus and species in an unqualified sense, without the condition of absoluteness, and that genus or species outside the mind adds nothing to the particular itself.

All things, however, are known to Allah, and He has chosen from them whatever He willed for His creation. His knowledge—glorified is He—is an intrinsic attribute of His Essence; it does not proceed from the things known. He is knowledgeable of everything before it is created; their very existence points to His knowledge and entails it, inasmuch as they are His creatures, issuing from His will—a will that necessarily involves conceiving what is willed—and for other reasons as well. As the Most High says: “Does He who created not know, while He is the Subtle, the All-Aware?” (Q 67:14).

Granted, the existence of particulars may imply that they are known in this respect, but that implication does not arise from them, nor does their existence require that they be universals. In short, the existence of an individual or a species does not entail the existence of anything more general than itself. When a particular—say, a given human being—comes into existence, all that follows is the existence of ‘human’ taken absolutely, without the condition of absoluteness; this does not necessitate the existence of a human being more general than that concrete individual.