Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-Falasifa - Ibn Taimiya - (35)

Mas'ala fi Tawhid al-FalasifaIbn Taimiya

Here, we adopt the stance of outright rejection; hence we shall not lengthen the discussion by presenting a detailed refutation of their view. What must be grasped, however, is that the substance of their discourse and the root of their deviation are of the same kind as the error of their forerunners: they confounded the mental conception of a thing’s quiddity and reality with the external existence that is that very quiddity and reality.

This is the fundamental point in which their earliest representatives went astray. Those early thinkers held that such mental conceptions subsist apart from the familiar external entities, whereas the later ones do not posit them as separate but as inseparable accompaniments. When they argue that the reality of a triangle is intelligible before any actual triangle exists—and advance similar proofs—the utmost they establish is that something can be conceived in the mind even though it has no existence outside the mind. About that there is no dispute: we know that what is conceived in intellect is other than what is realized in concrete existence. Had they meant by “essence” what is in the mind, and by “existent” what is outside it, we would not object to the claim that the existence of each thing is not identical with its essence. But that is not their intention. Rather, they maintain that the essence of every externally established thing is nevertheless distinct from its externally established existence.

The same objection applies to the Muʿtazilites who declare that the nonexistent is still a “thing.” If they had said that it is a thing in knowledge and in mental conception—that it is established in the realm of knowledge, conceived, known, mentioned, and spoken of before it comes into being—we would not have contested them. What they actually claim, however, is that it is established in external reality.

These two principles on which the objector’s two premises rest are among the foundational errors of the Peripatetic philosophers, of the renegades among the Arabs who follow them, and of anyone—be he theologian, jurist, or Sufi—who has walked their path.

The first of the two concerns their discussion of universals such as genus, differentia, and specific property

ونحنُ في هذا المقامِ في مقامِ المنع، فلا يطولُ الكلامُ بالدَّليلِ على فسادِ قولِهم، لكِنْ يَنبغي أنْ نعلمَ أنَّ مادّةَ كلامِهم وأصلَ ضلالِهم هوَ مِنْ جِنسِ ضلالِ سَلَفِهم، حيثُ اشتبهَ عليهِم ما يكونُ في الذِّهنِ مِنْ تصوُّرِ ماهيّةِ الشَّيءِ وحقيقتِهِ بما يكونُ في الخارجِ مِنْ وجودِهِ الذي هوَ حقيقتُهُ وماهيَّتُهُ. وهذا هوَ الأصلُ الذي ضَلَّ فيهِ أوَّلوهم، لكنَّ أولئكَ أثبتوا هذهِ المتصوّراتِ منفكَّةً عَنِ الموجوداتِ المشهورة، وهؤلاءِ لم يثبِتُوها منفصلةً عنها، بلْ ملازمةً لها، وهُم إذا احتَجُّوا بأنَّ حقيقةَ المثلَّثِ تُعقلُ قبلَ وجودِ المثلَّثِ ونحوَ ذلكَ مِنْ حُجَجِهم، فغايتُهُم أنْ يُثبِتوا أنَّهُ متصوَّرٌ في الذِّهنِ ما لا وجودَ لهُ في الخارج، وهذا لا نِزاعَ فيه، فنحنُ نعلَمُ أنَّ ما لا يُتصوَّرُ في الأذهانِ غيرُ ما يتحقَّقُ في الأعيان، ولو أرادوا باسمِ الماهيّةِ ما في الذِّهنِ وباسمِ الموجودِ ما في الخارجِ لم ننازعْهم في أنَّ وجودَ كُلِّ شيءٍ ليسَ هوَ ماهيَّتَهُ، لكنَّهم لا يَعنونَ هذا، وإنَّما يعنونَ أنَّ ماهيَّةَ كُلِّ شيءٍ الثّابتةَ في الخارجِ غيرُ وجودِهِ الثّابتِ في الخارج، كما أنَّ المعتزلةَ القائلينَ بأنَّ المعدومَ شيءٌ لو قالوا: إنَّهُ شيءٌ في العِلمِ وشيءٌ في الذِّهن، وأنَّهُ ثابتٌ في العِلمِ ومُتصوَّرٌ ومعلومٌ ومذكورٌ ومخبَرٌ عنهُ قبلَ وجودِه، لم ننازعْهم في ذلكَ، ولكنَّهم زَعموا أنَّهُ ثابتٌ في الخارجِ. فهذانِ الأصلانِ المبنيُّ عليهما هاتانِ المقدِّمتانِ اللَّتانِ ذكرَهما المستدِلُّ هما مِنْ أُصولِ ضلالِ هؤلاءِ المتفلسِفةِ المشّائِينَ، ومَنِ اتَّبعَهم مِنْ مُرتدّةِ العرَب، ومَنْ سَلكَ سبيلَهم مِنْ متكلِّمٍ ومتفقِّهٍ ومتصوِّفٍ. فالأوَّلُ يتعلَّقُ بكلامِهم في الكُلِّيّاتِ كالجِنسِ والفَصلِ والخاصّةِ