So your statement, “They differ in their individual essences while agreeing in a constitutive element,” is itself vague and puzzling—indeed, it is equivocal. If by it you mean that each one differs from the other by his own individuation while agreeing with him in something that is not individuated, that is incorrect; rather, for each of them the very element in which he differs from the other is individuated for him, just as the element in which he agrees with him is also individuated for him. The shared element—animality, for instance—differs in its individuation: this one possesses an animality peculiar to him, and that one possesses an animality peculiar to him. Hence, with respect to individuation and abstractness there is no difference between what you claim they disagreed about and what you claim they agreed upon; their divergence concerns resemblance and dissimilarity, not individuation and non-individuation.

If, on the other hand, what you intend by saying “they differ in their essences” is that they differ in the essences of their species—that is, by humanity and horseness—while agreeing in the necessary concomitant of both, namely animality, then it may likewise be said to you: they differed only by an unindividuated, species-level humanity and an unindividuated, species-level horseness, and they agreed in an unindividuated genus-level animality. Thus the point on which they differed is not particularized (1), and the point on which they agreed is not particularized either; the former is an unrestricted universal and the latter is likewise an unrestricted universal. Therefore, the distinction between what they differed about and what they agreed upon does not arise from individuation versus abstraction, but from likeness versus unlikeness. Let the intelligent, discerning reader reflect on this matter, for it opens the door to true knowledge and verification and removes the error that is the cause of confusion in this narrow strait. These people have taken attributes that are equal in both generality and specificity and, by sheer fiat, have labelled some of them particular and specific while labelling others absolute and general—this is the very essence of error. Whenever two things share in one respect and differ in another, the contrast between the shared and the distinguishing element stems from similarity and difference: the shared element is alike and homogeneous, calling for combination, whereas the distinguishing element is dissimilar and divergent, calling for separation. As for the standpoint of individuation versus abstraction, universal versus particular, and generality versus specificity, there is no