resembles the humanity that is in that one. This is what we mean when we say, “They coincide in humanity,” “The two agree in humanity,” or “They share humanity.” In this context, resemblance, likeness, agreement, and sharing all point to a single notion. Thus, this human being corresponds to, resembles, and is like him(1); he joins him in being a human. This instance of humanity is like that instance of humanity. We do not intend by this that the humanity of Zayd, which exists outside the mind, is itself the very same humanity of ʿAmr that exists outside the mind—for that would fly in the face of plain sense-perception, and no rational person would say so. The humanity of every individual is a quality that inheres in him, and a quality belonging to one subject does not inhere in another. Just as this human being is not that human being but only his counterpart, so this particular humanity is not numerically identical with that humanity; it is merely its counterpart.

Likewise, when it is said, “The human and the horse share animality,” the meaning is that in the human there is an animality that corresponds to the animality in the horse. They fall under one genus that embraces them through sensation and voluntary motion. The animality of man is not numerically identical with the animality of the horse, nor is his sensation the horse’s sensation, nor his voluntary motion the horse’s motion. Indeed, the animality of one individual man or horse is not the very animality of any other, nor is the perception of this man the perception of that one, nor his motion the very motion of that one, just as he himself is not, in his very self, that other. The term one, however, may be applied to what is one in kind and to what is one in individual. Therefore, when it is said, “Animality is one,” “Humanity is one,” “This animality is that animality,” or “This humanity is that humanity,” what is intended is oneness in kind, not numerical oneness or individual identity.