• Another of his universal rulings is that a legitimate substitute takes the place of the thing substituted for in the rulings of worship, transactions, rights, and so forth. Whenever an item possesses an acceptable replacement and the original is unattainable, that replacement stands in its stead and carries all its rulings. Likewise, any increase or yield (1) follows the principal.
• Another of his universal rulings is that whoever is under a binding obligation may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. If a person destroys someone else’s property solely to ward off its harm from himself, he incurs no liability; but if he destroys it in order to benefit from it, he must make restitution. Loss arising from an authorised act entails no liability, whereas loss arising from an unauthorised act is subject to liability.
• Another of his universal rulings is that exceptions, restrictions, and qualifying descriptions attached to utterances are recognised and limit the wording; the statement is bound by them, provided the connection is contiguous, whether in wording or in legal effect. This includes the phrases used in contracts, annulments, endowments, bequests, emancipations, divorces, oaths, acknowledgements, and the like.
• Another of his universal rulings is that partners in property and usufruct are required to bear every expense necessary to secure essential benefits and ward off harms. Whoever withholds his share is compelled to contribute toward the expenses, maintenance, and taxes that pertain to the property; they share these costs, each in proportion to his ownership.
• Another of his universal rulings is that anyone who directly destroys property—or who causes it to be destroyed—is liable for it, whether he acted intentionally, forgetfully, or ignorantly. When both a direct actor and an indirect causer are involved, liability rests with the direct actor, unless recovery from him is impossible because of absence, refusal, insolvency, or the like; in that case, liability is transferred to the indirect causer, provided that his causation was wrongful.