over him belongs entirely to the Messenger. He rules over him with greater authority than a master over his slave or a father (1) over his child; the servant therefore has no discretion over himself whatsoever except in matters in which the Messenger—who has a greater claim upon him than he has upon himself—has already exercised discretion.

How astonishing, then, that a servant should claim this precedence after he has dismissed what the Messenger brought from the seat of judgment, accepted the judgment of someone else, and felt more at ease with it than with the Messenger himself, finding greater reassurance (2) in that other ruling. He even maintains that guidance is not to be taken from the light of the Prophet’s lamp but rather from the indications (3) of human reason, and that what the Messenger (4) brought does not yield certainty—along with other statements that amount to turning away from him and from what he brought, and transferring the pursuit of beneficial knowledge to someone (5) other than him. That is manifest misguidance (6).

This precedence can be established only by dismissing everything besides him, entrusting him with authority in every matter, and presenting whatever anyone else says against what he has brought. If his teaching bears witness to its soundness, it is accepted; if his teaching bears witness to its falsehood, it is rejected; and if his witness is unclear—neither confirming (7) nor denying—it is treated like the reports of the People of the Book, left in suspension until it becomes clear which of the two rulings is more fitting.