—indeed, it is a head-on confrontation: he has treated what the Lawgiver intended as something of no consequence, while elevating to the rank of intention what the Lawgiver left unconsidered. That is open defiance of the Shariah.
Second: The upshot of such an intention is that whatever the Lawgiver has declared good the doer now deems not good, and whatever the Lawgiver has not declared good he deems good. This, too, is opposition.
Third: The Most High says, “Whoever opposes the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him and follows a path other than that of the believers—we shall leave him to the path he has chosen” (Q 4:115). ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz said, “The Messenger of Allah ﷺ and the rulers after him have laid down Sunnahs; whoever holds fast to them is rightly guided, and whoever contravenes them has followed a path other than that of the believers.”
Fourth: A person who takes up a prescribed act while aiming at a purpose the Lawgiver did not intend is, in reality, not performing the prescribed act at all. The Lawgiver instituted it for a determinate purpose; if the doer sets out to attain something other than that known purpose, he has not brought the prescribed act into being. By failing to do so, he contradicts the Law, becoming like one who does what he was not commanded and neglects what he was commanded.
Categories of the accountable person’s intention in acting
When the benefit intended by a legal duty is known, the legally accountable person can approach it in three ways:
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He intends by the act the very purpose he has understood to be the Lawgiver’s purpose in legislating it. There is no doubt this coincides with the Shariah, yet he should not deprive the act of the intention of worship. Many a person, having perceived the benefit, focuses on nothing else and neglects the worshipful intention; such heedlessness forfeits great good, unlike the one who does not neglect worship.
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He intends by the act whatever purpose the Lawgiver may have intended, whether he has perceived it or not—as though he resolves, “Through this deed I aim at whatever the Lawgiver intended by instituting it.” This is more complete