legislating it; and the proof for this lies plain in the very framework of the Shariah.

We have already established that the Law has been laid down, absolutely and comprehensively, for the welfare of human beings. The legally responsible person is therefore required to let his actions proceed on that basis and not to seek a purpose at odds with the Lawgiver’s purpose.

Furthermore, the servant was created to worship Allah, and worship in essence means acting in accordance with the intention embedded in the Shariah. By doing so he earns reward in both this world and the Hereafter.

Again, the Lawgiver’s aim is to safeguard the essentials of life, together with the complementary needs and refinements that stem from them; this is the very cause (‘illah) behind the obligations imposed on the servant. Consequently, the servant must intend that same aim; otherwise he is not truly working to preserve it—for “actions are judged by intentions.”

Whoever seeks in his deed other than what the Lawgiver intended, his deed is null and his reward forfeited:

Anyone who, in carrying out a legal obligation, pursues a purpose other than the one for which it was prescribed has contradicted the Shariah; and whoever contradicts it, the act by which he contradicts it is invalid. The prescribed acts were instituted only to procure benefits and repel harms. When they are opposed, no benefit is obtained through those opposing acts, nor is any harm averted.

Thus, whoever looks to the Shariah for something it was not instituted to achieve is in opposition to it.

The evidence for this appears from several angles:

First: From the standpoint of pure reason, actions and abstentions are equivalent with respect to the ends sought by them; reason in itself neither declares something good nor bad. When the Lawgiver designates one of two equivalent matters as conducive to benefit and the other as conducive to harm, He clarifies the aspect by which benefit is realized and therefore commands or permits it, and He clarifies the aspect by which harm is realized and therefore forbids it—out of mercy for His servants. If the accountable person intends precisely what the Lawgiver intended, he has sought the aspect of benefit in its fullest form and is deserving that it should be attained. But if he intends other than what the Lawgiver intended—this usually happens because he imagines that the benefit lies in what he has chosen, for a rational person does not deliberately aim at the aspect of harm