by explicit textual evidence and by the unanimous agreement of the jurists; this shows that the promise itself is no longer binding.

Ibn Shubruma, however, held that keeping a promise is obligatory both before Allah and in a court of law. A number of early authorities shared this view, among them ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Isḥāq ibn Rāhawayah, and the Zāhirīs.

Those who adopt this position cite several passages from the Quran and Sunnah, including:
• “O believers, fulfil your covenants” (Qur’an 5:1).
• “O believers, why do you say what you do not do? It is deeply hateful to Allah that you say what you do not do” (Qur’an 61:2–3).
• Al-Bukhārī 33 and Muslim 59 record that the Prophet ﷺ said, “The signs of the hypocrite are three,” and he mentioned among them: “When he makes a promise, he breaks it.” Hence breaking a promise is one of the traits of hypocrisy and is therefore forbidden.
• Al-Tirmidhī 1995 narrates that the Prophet ﷺ said, “Do not argue with your brother, do not jest with him excessively, and do not promise him something only to break it.”

The Mālikīs offered a more nuanced ruling. They state that keeping a promise becomes compulsory—religiously and judicially—when the promise is tied to a specific cause, such as inviting someone to enter the market to purchase an item or to embark on a project; if the promisee then acts on that assurance and finds himself committed, the promisor must follow through. If, however, withdrawing the promise causes the promisee no harm, the obligation does not stand.

Their rationale is that the textual evidences on this issue appear to clash, and this distinction is, in their view, the best reconciliation.

Al-Shanqītī writes in his tafsīr: “Scholars differ over whether fulfilling a pledge is obligatory. Some say it is obligatory without exception; others say it is never obligatory; and still others maintain that if the promise places the recipient in a predicament, fulfilment becomes compulsory, otherwise it does not.”