Ibn al-Qayyim, outlining the evidentiary bases for the three opinions, said:

1. The foundation for those who regard the statement as an oath that demands expiation is Allah’s word, “O Prophet, why do you forbid for yourself what Allah has made lawful for you?” (al-Tahrim 1). Immediately after, He says, “Allah has prescribed for you the dissolution of your oaths” (al-Tahrim 2), together with the report from Ibn ‘Abbas cited above. The author of al-Sharh al-Kabir comments: “This view is the closest to the truth and the weightiest of all.”

2. The basis for the second view is that the wording is not coined exclusively for divorce; it is equally capable of meaning divorce, zihar, or ila’. When the husband, by his intention, directs it to any one of these meanings, he has employed the phrase for something to which it is suited. Consequently, the legal ruling follows his intention—no more and no less.

3. The basis for the third view is that the expression itself conveys prohibition, while a servant of Allah has no authority to declare things lawful or unlawful. What he can do is initiate the causes to which those rulings attach. Hence, when he forbids for himself what Allah has permitted, he utters a reprehensible falsehood and is treated as if he had said, “You are to me like my mother’s back.” In fact, this statement is even more deserving of being classified as zihar: when he likens his wife to a woman permanently unlawful to him, the prohibition is implied; if he explicitly declares her unlawful, he has plainly stated the very consequence implied by the wording of zihar. It is therefore even more fitting that his statement be treated as zihar.