in reality; he only called it “hidden infanticide” because a man practises withdrawal to flee from pregnancy, so his intention is treated as the intention behind infanticide. The difference, however, is that overt infanticide involves a manifest act in which both the intent and the deed coincide, whereas withdrawal pertains to intent alone; for that reason it was described as hidden. On this basis the two ḥadiths are reconciled.

17 – Ḥadīth no. 889 establishes that lineage is ascribed even when withdrawal is employed.

18 – Ḥadīths no. 889 and no. 980 together indicate the permissibility of coitus interruptus.

19 – The jurists differed over its permissibility because of the apparent divergence between the reports:
• The three imams deemed withdrawal permissible, acting on the narrations that allow it.
• Imam Aḥmad judged it impermissible unless the wife—who shares with her husband both pleasure and the prospect of children—gives her consent, basing this on the ḥadīth of Jadhāmah bint Wahb recorded by Muslim.

• Birth control:

In recent times a theory of birth control has appeared and has been promoted as an economic principle, on the grounds that, in their view, the population is rising rapidly while the growth of food supplies follows only a modest arithmetic progression.

This theory has been examined in the light of Islamic law by reference to two ḥadiths: the ḥadīth of Jadhāmah bint Wahb, no. 888, and the ḥadīth of Abū Saʿīd, no. 889. The first points to the prohibition of withdrawal, describing it as an offence against the seminal fluid and tantamount to killing it; the second affirms the permissibility of withdrawal and that it has no effect on destroying the life that might arise from that fluid.

The reconciliation is that withdrawal is not genuine infanticide; it was called “infanticide” only because the practitioner intends thereby to prevent pregnancy, so it was likened to infanticide. In actual infanticide, by contrast, intention is joined to the direct act of killing. Thus it becomes clear that ḥadīth no. 888 was not intended to impose an absolute prohibition and therefore does not conflict with ḥadīth no. 889. Preventing conception is not unlawful in and of itself so as to be prohibited unconditionally; rather, it can be forbidden because of its objectives, and hence the matter calls for the detailed distinctions that have been set out.