because he had not rushed to seize the estate, whereas the diyah is a debt he himself owes; it is therefore meaningless for him to inherit something that is binding upon him.

• Abū Ḥanīfah held that the killing which bars inheritance is any act that obligates qiṣāṣ (retaliatory execution) or an expiatory penalty. This covers intentional homicide, quasi-intentional homicide, accidental homicide, and anything comparable—such as a sleeper’s rolling over a relative or falling on him. By contrast, death caused by digging a pit, placing a rock in a roadway, or when the killer is a child or insane, as well as execution carried out as qiṣāṣ and the like, does not block inheritance, because none of these require qiṣāṣ or expiation; and those two, in the Ḥanafī view, are the foundation of any killing that nullifies inheritance.

• Aḥmad maintained that the killing which prevents inheritance is every wrongful killing that entails liability—whether retaliation, blood-money, or expiation—such as intentional, quasi-intentional, or accidental homicide, and everything analogous to accidental killing, like indirect causation of death or a killing committed by a child, an insane person, or one who is asleep.

As for a killing that carries none of those liabilities, it does not preclude inheritance—such as execution by way of qiṣāṣ, enforcement of a ḥadd, killing in self-defense, or a just ruler’s killing of a rebel. All of these leave the killer’s right to inherit intact because the bar to inheritance follows liability: when no liability rests on the killer, inheritance is not denied. This is the governing principle according to the Ḥanbalīs, and it is the weightiest opinion, for it accords with the evidences and strikes a middle course between the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī positions. Allah knows best.