in every debt that becomes binding as compensation for property that has fallen into the debtor’s hand—such as the sale price of goods, the repayment of a loan—or that he has undertaken by contract, like a dowry or a surety.
He is not to be jailed for anything else once he says, “I am indigent,” unless the creditor proves that he owns wealth. In that case the judge may detain him for two or three months and make further inquiry; if no assets surface, he is set free.
The judge must not place any barrier between him and his creditors.
A man may be imprisoned for failing to provide maintenance to his wife, but a father is not jailed on account of his child’s debt—unless he refuses to support the child.
A woman’s judgment is valid in every matter except ḥudūd (fixed penalties) and qiṣāṣ (retaliatory punishments).
A written ruling sent by one judge to another concerning private rights is admissible if it is attested before the sending judge. If the witnesses testify in the presence of the defendant, he rules on the basis of their testimony and records his decision; if they testify in the defendant’s absence, he issues no ruling, but merely records the testimony so that the addressee may judge by it.
The letter is accepted only on the testimony of two men, or of one man and two women. The text must be read aloud to the witnesses so that they know its contents; then, in their presence, the judge seals the document and hands it to them. When it reaches the receiving judge, he does not admit it except in the presence of the defendant. If the witnesses testify, “This is the letter of Judge So-and-so; he delivered it to us in open court, read it to us, and sealed it,” the receiving judge breaks the seal, reads the letter to the defendant, and obliges him to what it states.
A judge’s letter to another judge is not accepted in cases of ḥudūd or qiṣāṣ.
A judge may not appoint a deputy to exercise judicial authority unless that authority has explicitly been delegated to him.
When a judge reviews the ruling of another judge, he upholds it—unless it contradicts the Quran, the Sunnah, or the consensus, or is an opinion unsupported by any evidence.
A judge may not rule against an absent party unless a representative appears on his behalf.
If two litigants appoint an arbitrator and both are satisfied to abide by his decision, that is permissible provided the arbitrator possesses the qualifications of a judge.
It is impermissible to appoint as arbitrator an unbeliever, a slave, a dhimmī, a person who has been flogged for slander, an open sinner, or a minor.
Either party may withdraw from the arbitration so long as no judgment has yet been issued; once judgment is passed, both are bound by it. If the arbitrator’s decision is later brought before a judge and accords with the judge’s school, he ratifies it; if it conflicts with it, he nullifies it.
Arbitration is not allowed in ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ.
If someone arbitrates an unintentional killing and rules that the ʿāqila (the male agnates collectively liable) must pay the diya (blood-money), his ruling is not enforced.
The arbitrator may take witness testimony and may rule on the basis of a defendant’s refusal to take an oath (nukūl).
Any judgment a judge issues in favor of his parents, his children, or his wife is void.