after she has been married to another man, that i lāʾ does not in itself create a divorce, and the oath remains in force. Should he then have intercourse with her, he must pay the expiation for his oath.

If a man swears to abstain for less than four months, he is not deemed to have performed i lāʾ. But if he ties his abstention to performing a pilgrimage, a fast, a charitable payment, the manumission of a slave, or the pronouncement of a divorce, he is regarded as having made i lāʾ.

If he makes i lāʾ against a wife whom he has revocably divorced, it is valid; if he makes it against a wife he has divorced irrevocably, it is not. For a slave-woman the statutory period of i lāʾ is two months.

When the husband is ill and incapable of intercourse, or the wife is ill, or a distance separates them so that he cannot reach her within the term of i lāʾ, his retraction (fayʾ) is simply to declare with his tongue, “I have returned to her.” Once he makes that statement, the i lāʾ is lifted. If he recovers within the prescribed period, that verbal retraction is nullified and only intercourse will count as his fayʾ.

If a man says to his wife, “You are forbidden to me,” he is questioned about his intention. If he replies, “I was only lying,” the words have no legal effect. If he says, “I meant divorce,” it counts as a single irrevocable divorce, unless he intended three. If he says, “I meant ẓihār,” it is ẓihār. And if he says, “I merely intended to make her unlawful,” or, “I intended nothing at all,” the utterance is treated as an oath, thereby placing him among those who have performed i lāʾ.