for his share of any child that might be born, and a deferred manumission (tadbīr) does not itself bring about sarāyah, nor—according to the sounder opinion—does a debt that consumes the whole estate block the extension.

If someone says to his solvent partner, “I have freed your share; you must therefore pay me the value of my share,” and the partner denies the claim, he is believed on oath. Consequently his own portion is not emancipated, while the claimant’s portion becomes free by his own admission—provided we adopt the view that sarāyah is triggered merely by an act of emancipation—and that freedom does not extend to the share of the one who denied the claim.

Suppose he says to his partner, “If you free your share, then my share is free after yours,” and the partner does in fact emancipate while solvent. If we hold that sarāyah occurs through the act of emancipation, the freedom spreads to the first partner’s share and he must pay its value.

If, instead, he stipulates, “then all of my share is free,” and the partner emancipates, then—if the one whose freedom was contingent is insolvent—each of the two shares is freed on its owner’s behalf and the patronage (walāʾ) is divided between them. The same ruling applies when he is solvent and we set aside the problem of circularity; otherwise, nothing is freed.

If a slave is owned half by one man, one-third by another, and one-sixth by a third, and the latter two emancipate their shares simultaneously, they must pay the outstanding value in equal halves, according to the authoritative view.

A prerequisite for sarāyah is that the emancipation be voluntary. Therefore, if some of the heirs acquire a share of the slave by inheritance, sarāyah does not follow. For a sick owner who is insolvent, sarāyah can reach only one-third of his estate; and where the deceased was insolvent, a bequest to free his share is of no effect.

Section

When a legally competent person acquires ownership—whether by gift or bequest—of an ascendant or a descendant, that relative is automatically freed. One may not purchase a close relative on behalf of a minor. If, however, such a relative is given or bequeathed to the child and the slave is capable of earning, the guardian must accept: the slave is freed and supports himself from his earnings. If the slave is unable to earn and the child is insolvent, acceptance is still obligatory and the freedman’s maintenance is drawn from the public treasury; but if the child is solvent, acceptance is forbidden.

Should a man, during his final illness, acquire a relative without consideration, the relative is freed out of one-third of his estate—some say out of the entire estate. If he acquires the relative for full value without favoritism, the cost likewise comes out of the one-third and the freedman does not inherit. If the purchaser is indebted, one opinion declares the purchase invalid; the sounder opinion affirms its validity but rules that the slave is not freed—instead he is sold to satisfy the debt. Where the purchase price included a concession, the amount of the reduction is treated as a gift and the balance is charged to the one-third.

If a third party gives to a slave a partial ownership of a relative of the slave’s master, the slave accepts, and we hold that the gift itself effects emancipation of that portion, the sarāyah extends to the remainder and the master becomes liable for its full value.