and he replies, “It is not mine,” or, “It belongs to a man I do not know,” or, “to my minor son,” or, “it has been endowed for the poor,” or, “for such-and-such a mosque,” then—on the sounder view—the litigation is not diverted from him, the object is not taken from his hand, and the claimant must put him on oath that he is under no obligation to deliver it, unless evidence is produced.

If he acknowledges it for a named person who is present and can be sued and put on oath, that person is summoned: if he confirms the admission, the dispute is transferred to him; if he denies it, the article remains with the one who made the admission. Another opinion holds that it is handed over to the claimant, and another that the judge places it in safekeeping because the owner has now come to light.

If he acknowledges it for someone who is absent, the preponderant view is that the suit leaves him and the matter is suspended until the absentee returns. Should the claimant possess evidence, judgment is given on its basis—this constitutes a judgment against an absentee—and the claimant must swear as well; another opinion says that judgment is against the person who is present.

Whatever a slave confesses to that entails punishment is pursued against the slave himself, and he must answer; but whatever involves money—such as indemnity for injury—is pursued against the master.

Section

The oath taken by plaintiff and defendant is intensified in cases that are neither financial nor aimed at financial gain, and in property cases where the amount reaches the zakāt threshold. The manner of intensification in liʿān has already been detailed. One swears categorically regarding his own act, and likewise regarding another’s act when affirming it; but when denying, he swears to his lack of knowledge.

If someone claims a debt owed to his deceased relative and the defendant says, “He absolved me,” the defendant swears that he has no knowledge of any absolution. If a claimant says, “Your slave injured me so as to incur such-and-such liability,” the sounder opinion is that the owner swears categorically.

I say: should he say, “Your animal injured me,” he unquestionably swears categorically—and Allah knows best. It is permissible to swear categorically on a strong presumption based on one’s own handwriting or that of one’s father.

What counts is the intention of the judge who administers the oath; therefore, if the swearer engages in mental reservation, interprets the words contrary to that intention, or inserts an inaudible exception, he does not escape the sin of perjury.

Anyone upon whom an oath is imposed, such that an admission would make the claim binding, may deny and take the oath. A judge is not required to swear that he will not be unjust in his rulings, nor a witness that he has not lied.

If a defendant says, “I am a minor,” he is not put on oath and the matter is suspended until he reaches majority. An oath only terminates the lawsuit for the moment; it does not establish innocence. Thus, if he is made to swear and later produces evidence, judgment is rendered on the strength of that evidence.

If the defendant says, “He has already put me on oath once; let him swear that he did not,” the claimant is, on the sounder view, allowed to do so. When the defendant refuses to swear, the claimant swears and judgment is entered in his favor, and no further judgment is rendered.