—then, according to the school’s established view, he may not receive his portion. When the excuse ceases, he takes the oath and collects it without any need for the testimony to be repeated.
Testimony to an act—such as riba (usury), ghasb (usurpation), willful destruction, or childbirth—is admissible only when based on direct sight, though it is accepted from a deaf witness. As for spoken matters, like the wording of a contract, the witness must have heard the statement and seen the speaker. A blind person’s testimony is not admitted unless the party confesses in the blind man’s ear; in that case the blind man may keep hold of him until he testifies before the judge, which is the sounder opinion. If someone who was sighted bore the testimony and later lost his sight, he may still testify, provided that the person for or against whom he testifies is known to him by name and lineage.
Whoever has heard another’s statement or seen his act, and knows that individual’s physical identity together with his name and lineage, may testify against him—by pointing to him when he is present, and by naming him when he is absent or deceased. Should he lack knowledge of both the name and the lineage, he may not testify once the person is absent or dead. It is invalid to assume testimony about a veiled woman on the strength of her voice alone; but if he recognizes her by her face, or by name and lineage, it is permissible. When giving the testimony he must speak only of what he himself knows. According to the more prevalent opinion, he may not take on that testimony merely on the identification offered by one upright person—or even two—though actual practice often diverges from this view.
If evidence establishing a right against someone has been presented and the plaintiff asks that it be recorded, the judge shall record the defendant’s distinguishing physical features, not his name and lineage, unless those have already been proven. Testimony based on common report (tasaamuʿ) is allowed concerning a person’s paternal lineage and tribal affiliation, and—according to the sounder view—his maternal lineage as well, and it is accepted for his death according to the madhhab; it is not accepted, however, for claims of manumission, walaʾ (clientage), endowment, marriage, or ownership, which is the sounder position.
I say: the position judged soundest by the verifying scholars and the majority is that common-report testimony is permissible in all of those cases. Allah knows best. The condition for such testimony is that it be heard from a group whose collusion upon falsehood is inconceivable, though another opinion deems two upright informants sufficient.
Testimony to ownership is not admissible on mere possession, nor on possession accompanied by acts of disposal over a short period; it is admissible after a long period, according to the sound view, provided that the possessor has behaved as an owner—residing, demolishing and building, selling, mortgaging, and the like. Proof of insolvency may be established through circumstantial indicators, outward signs of hardship, and evidence of indebtedness.