and that your principal has instructed that the property be handed over.”
When a liability is proven against an absentee who possesses property within the judge’s jurisdiction, the judge settles the debt from those assets. If no such assets exist and the plaintiff asks that the matter be referred to the judge in the absentee’s district, the request is granted. The case is then forwarded in one of two ways: either a note is sent confirming that the evidence was heard so that the other judge may rule on its basis and then collect the amount, or an actual copy of the ruling is dispatched so that it may simply be enforced.
This referral, called inhaʾ, is attested to by two upright witnesses. It is recommended that it be put in writing, that the document include distinguishing details of the person against whom judgment was rendered, and that it be sealed, after which the two witnesses attest to it.
If the defendant denies the document and says, “I am not the person named in it,” he is believed upon taking an oath. The plaintiff must then prove that the name and lineage recorded in the document belong to that defendant. If the plaintiff furnishes such proof and the defendant still says, “I am not the one against whom judgment was pronounced,” the ruling binds him unless someone else shares his name and identifying traits. Should such a namesake exist, he is brought before the court; if, once present, he admits the claim, he is required to satisfy it and the first man is released. If he too denies liability, the judge writes to the clerk, requesting the witnesses to add an additional distinguishing characteristic, which is then recorded in a second document.
If the judge of the absentee’s district comes to the present judge’s town and delivers his ruling orally, scholars disagree as to whether that judgment may be enforced once he returns to his own jurisdiction, for at that point he would be ruling by his personal knowledge. If he pronounces it on the shared border of their two provinces, it is executed.
Should the referring judge confine himself to noting that he has heard the evidence, he writes, “I have heard the testimony against so-and-so,” naming the witnesses unless he has already declared them upright; in that latter case, the sounder view is that mentioning their names is not obligatory. A written judgment takes effect even when the distance between the two courts is short, whereas a mere attestation of having heard the evidence is, according to the soundest opinion, accepted only when the distance is such that shahāda ʿalā shahāda (testimony on testimony) is admissible.
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If a plaintiff claims a specific property located outside the town whose identity is secure against confusion—such as a particular piece of real estate, a well-known slave, or a well-known horse—the judge hears the evidence, rules in his favour, and writes to the judge of the district where the property is, instructing him to hand it over to the plaintiff; in the case of land, reliance is placed on its stated boundaries.
If confusion is feared, the stronger opinion is that the evidence is still heard, but the plaintiff must offer an exhaustive description, state the item’s value, and the court refrains from issuing judgment; instead, it writes to