and, on the sounder opinion, the entire treaty is likewise invalid.

If the instrument stipulates the return of anyone who comes over to us—or says nothing at all about the matter—and then a woman joins the Muslims, we are, according to the preponderant view, not obliged to pay her husband the dower he had given her.

Neither is a minor or an insane person to be sent back, and the same ruling—on the relied-upon position—applies to a slave and to a freeman who has no clan. By contrast, anyone who does have a tribe is returned if that very tribe, and no one else, demands him—unless the person sought is able to overpower the claimant and escape.

“Return” here means only that we step aside and leave him in the claimant’s reach; we do not force him to go back, nor is he legally bound to do so. He may even kill the pursuer, and we may hint at that possibility to him, though we may not say it outright.

Should the truce contain a clause obliging them to hand over anyone from our side who has apostatized and taken refuge with them, they must abide by it; if they refuse, they have broken the pact. The stronger view, however, is that it is equally lawful to stipulate that they are not required to return such apostates.