nothing is established, and—according to the sounder opinion—the right of retaliation is not thereby extinguished.

A person placed under financial interdiction for insolvency may not pardon in return for money if we hold that one of the two entitlements (retaliation or blood money) is fixed. If, however, we adopt the alternative view, then should he pardon in exchange for the blood money the settlement stands; if his pardon is left unconditional, the ruling is as already explained; and if he pardons on condition that no money be payable, the authoritative position is that nothing at all becomes due. A spendthrift is treated like an insolvent debtor regarding blood money, though some liken him to a minor.

If the parties settle the claim of retaliation for one hundred camels, the settlement is void when we consider one entitlement to be obligatory; otherwise, the stronger view is that it is valid.

Should a competent adult say, “Cut me,” and the other complies, the blood is forfeit; if the wound later spreads, or if he says, “Kill me,” and he is killed, the blood is likewise forfeit, although another opinion requires the blood money.

If someone amputates a limb and the victim then waives both retaliation and the monetary compensation (arsh), nothing further is owed provided no spreading occurs; if it does spread, there is still no retaliation. As for the compensation for the limb itself: if the wording used is that of a bequest—such as, “I bequeath to him the compensation for this injury,” which is in effect a bequest to the assailant—or a wording of release, renunciation, or pardon, the claim is dropped. Some say that, in the case of a bequest, the balance up to the full blood money must still be paid; another opinion holds that if the pardon expressly covers any later consequences, the claim is likewise waived.

If the injury later spreads to another limb and then heals, the blood money for the spreading is payable according to the sounder opinion.

When, because the wound has spread, a person holds the right of retaliation for life in addition to the original right for the limb, then if he pardons the life he may no longer amputate; but if he pardons the limb, he still has the choice of striking the neck, according to the stronger view.

If he has already amputated the offender’s limb and then pardons the life claim gratis, and the amputation later spreads, the invalidity of the pardon becomes manifest; otherwise, the pardon remains effective.

If he appoints an agent to carry out the retaliation and subsequently issues a pardon, but the agent, unaware of it, proceeds to exact retaliation, no retaliation falls upon the agent. The more correct view is that blood money becomes due, that it is borne by the agent himself and not by his agnates, and that he has no recourse against the one who pardoned.

If retaliation is due against a woman and he marries her, making that right his bridal gift, the marriage is valid and the retaliation is extinguished. Should they later separate, it is said that after intercourse he is entitled to half of the indemnity, while another opinion gives him half the normal bridal gift for a woman of her standing.