—nothing. If a person surreptitiously mixes something (such as poison) into food that its owner is in the habit of eating, and the victim then eats it unknowingly, the same three opinions just mentioned apply.

If an injured person neglects to treat a wound that is normally fatal and dies as a result, qiṣāṣ is obligatory. If the aggressor throws the victim into water that is not ordinarily fatal—such as a broad, shallow pool—and the victim remains lying there until he dies, no liability is incurred. But if the water is of the kind from which one cannot escape except by swimming, then:
• If the victim does not know how to swim, or is bound, or is physically disabled, the killing is intentional.
• If a circumstantial obstacle—wind, waves, and the like—prevents him from swimming, the act is quasi-intentional.
• If he could have swum to safety but chose not to, then, according to the sounder view, no diyah is due.

The same divisions apply when the aggressor casts him into a fire from which escape is possible and the victim remains there until he dies: there are two opinions about the diyah, and in both cases no qiṣāṣ is taken. A further opinion, however, holds that qiṣāṣ may in fact be due in the case of fire.

If one man restrains the victim and a second kills him, or one digs a pit and another pushes him into it, or one throws him from a height and another receives him below and cuts him, then qiṣāṣ rests upon the killer, the one who cast him down, and the one who set the cause in motion—and upon no one else.

If he throws the victim into deep water and a fish devours him, qiṣāṣ is obligatory according to the preponderant view; if the water was not deep enough to drown, then it is not.

If a man coerces another to kill, qiṣāṣ is due on the coercer, and—according to the stronger opinion—on the coerced party as well. Should a diyah instead be payable, it is divided between them; and if only one of them actually performs the killing, qiṣāṣ falls solely on him.

When an adult forces an adolescent who is near puberty to kill, the adult alone is liable to qiṣāṣ, for the deliberate act of the minor is treated as intentional killing, and this is the dominant position.

If he compels another to shoot at a figure, while the coercer knows it is a man and the coerced believes it to be game, the sounder view is that qiṣāṣ is due on the coercer. If he forces him to shoot at game and the arrow strikes a man instead, no qiṣāṣ is due on either of them.

If he obliges him to climb a tree, the man slips and dies, the killing is quasi-intentional; in the earlier shooting case it was intentional. For compelling someone to take his own life, there is, according to the preferred view, no qiṣāṣ.

If the victim says, “Kill me or I will kill you,” and the other kills him, the school’s position is that there is no qiṣāṣ, and the sounder opinion holds that there is no diyah either. If he says, “Kill Zayd or ʿAmr,” this does not amount to coercion.

Section

When two people simultaneously inflict fatal wounds—such as both cutting the throat, or each severing a vital limb—both are executed in retaliation. If one of them reduces the victim to the convulsive state of a slaughtered animal so that sight, speech, and voluntary motion have ceased, and then a second assailant strikes him, the liability rests with the first aggressor alone.