Section
Under the new, authoritative position, a wife’s maintenance becomes obligatory only once she has actually enabled conjugal access (tamkīn), not merely by the conclusion of the contract. If the spouses dispute whether such access occurred, the husband’s word is accepted. For any period in which she did not present herself to him, no maintenance is due; if she did present herself, the obligation begins from the moment the news of her offer reaches him. When the husband is away, the judge writes to the judge in the husband’s locality to inform him so that he may return or appoint an agent; if he does neither and enough time passes for the letter to reach him, the judge sets a compulsory allowance for her.
In the case of an insane wife or a girl approaching puberty, an offer made by her guardian suffices. The right to maintenance lapses through nushūz (recalcitrance), even if it is only her refusal to allow physical contact without excuse; a valid excuse includes the husband’s excessive corpulence or an illness that would make intercourse harmful. Leaving his house without permission is likewise nushūz, unless the building is on the verge of collapse. Travel undertaken with his permission—whether she accompanies him or attends to one of his needs—does not void her allowance, whereas travel undertaken for her own purposes does, according to the sounder view.
If she had become recalcitrant and the husband then travelled, her subsequent obedience does not restore her allowance on the more correct opinion; the judge must still write to him as described above. Should she leave the house during his absence for a social visit and the like, her maintenance is not cancelled.
The stronger view is that a minor wife has no claim to maintenance, whereas an adult wife married to a minor husband does. Entering the state of iḥrām for ḥajj or ʿumrah without his permission counts as nushūz if he lacks the legal power to release her; but if he possesses that power, she is not deemed rebellious until she actually departs. A woman who intends to travel for her own need—or even with his permission—remains entitled to maintenance until she sets out, according to the sounder view.
He may forbid her from observing a voluntary fast; if she refuses, she is considered recalcitrant in the preponderant opinion. The more correct view further holds that making up missed obligatory fasts is not so time-restricted that he may not also forbid her from them, whereas he may not stop her from performing an obligatory prayer at the start of its time, nor from the regular sunan prayers attached to it.
A woman in a revocable divorce (rajʿī) remains entitled to all expenses except those connected to adornment and beautification. If the husband supposes her to be pregnant and spends on that basis, only to discover after her waiting period that she was not, he may recover whatever he paid after that period. An irrevocably divorced woman who is not pregnant—whether the divorce occurred by khulʿ or by three pronouncements—has no right to maintenance or clothing, whereas they are owed to a pregnant woman in that situation. One opinion holds that the entitlement is for the fetus rather than for her; according to the first opinion, therefore, no maintenance is due to a woman pregnant through doubtful intercourse or an invalid marriage.
I add: A widow in her waiting period is not entitled to maintenance, even if she is pregnant—Allah knows best. The maintenance owed during a pregnant woman’s waiting period is assessed as it was during the marriage, although another view states that only what suffices her is obligatory. Payment need not be handed over until the pregnancy becomes apparent; once it does, it must be provided day by day, and yet another view defers the obligation until she delivers. In any case, the claim is not forfeited by the mere passage of time according to the authoritative position.