Section
The waiting period of a pregnant woman ends with her delivery, provided the child can be affiliated—even as a mere possibility—to the man for whom she is observing the ʿiddah, such as a child denied through liʿān (mutual imprecation). The delivery must involve the whole foetus, including the second of twins, and if the second birth follows the first by less than six lunar months, the two are deemed twins.

The ʿiddah likewise terminates upon the expulsion of a lifeless foetus that has progressed beyond the clot stage (ʿalaqa), or of a mudgha (a small lump of flesh) in which the midwives discern a faint human form. If no form is visible yet they testify that what has emerged is fundamentally human, the waiting period is considered complete according to the madhhab.

Should a pregnancy attributable to the husband become apparent while she is counting an ʿiddah of quruʾ (menstrual cycles) or of months, she switches to an ʿiddah that ends with delivery. If she merely suspects that she is pregnant, she may not contract a new marriage until the doubt is removed—whether that takes place before any contract or afterwards. If she marries despite the doubt, the relied-upon view is that the marriage is not invalidated immediately; however, once grounds for annulment are established, it is annulled.

If the husband effected an irrevocable separation (ibānah) and she gives birth within four lunar years, the child is ascribed to him; if the interval exceeds four years, it is not. Where the divorce was revocable, the four-year period is reckoned from the date of divorce, though another opinion counts it from the completion of the ʿiddah.

If, after finishing her ʿiddah, she remarries and then gives birth in less than six months, the event is treated as though no second marriage had occurred; if the birth takes place at six months or more, the child belongs to the second husband.

When she enters a void marriage during her ʿiddah and later gives birth, the ruling depends on possibility: if the child could be from the first husband, it is attributed to him, her ʿiddah ends with that delivery, and she must then observe a fresh ʿiddah for the second man. If it could only be from the second, it is attributed to him. Where both possibilities remain, the matter is referred to a qāʾif (lineage expert); if he affiliates the child to one of them, the ruling proceeds as though attribution to that man alone were possible.

Section
A woman may become liable for two waiting periods owed to the same husband of the same type. This happens, for example, when he divorces her and then, during a revocable divorce, has intercourse with her while she is still in an ʿiddah counted by quruʾ or by months, whether he knows the ruling or not. In such a case the two ʿiddahs merge: she begins a new ʿiddah from the time of intercourse, and whatever remained of the first ʿiddah is subsumed within it.

If one of the two ʿiddahs is for pregnancy and the later one is calculated by quruʾ, the preferred opinion is that they likewise merge; both conclude with the delivery, and he may take her back before she gives birth. Another view says that if the pregnancy itself resulted from that intercourse, the two waiting periods do not merge.

Two distinct ʿiddahs may also be owed to two different men—for instance, she is in the ʿiddah of a husband or because of doubtful intercourse, and is then cohabited with under shubhah or a new marriage