of any day within that month, the divorce takes effect at the break of dawn on the first day. If he says, “at its end,” it is effective at the very last instant of the month—although another opinion places it at the beginning of the latter half of the month.

Should he say at night, “when a day has passed,” the divorce falls at sunset of the following day; if he makes the same statement during the daytime, it falls at the corresponding hour on the next day. If he says, “at the end of the day,” and utters this during daylight, it falls at that day’s sunset; otherwise the statement is void. The same rule, by analogy, applies to a month or a year.

If he declares, “You are divorced—yesterday,” intending the divorce to take effect immediately while being ascribed to yesterday, it is effective at once—though another opinion deems the wording idle. If he means that he actually divorced her yesterday and that she is now in her waiting period, he is believed upon his oath. Likewise, if he says, “I divorced you in a previous marriage,” and such a marriage is known, he is believed on oath; if not, he is not believed.

The particles used to suspend a divorce include man (whoever), in (if), idhā (when), matā and matā mā (whenever), kullamā (every time), and ay (any), as in the phrase “at whatever time you enter.” These particles do not of themselves entail immediacy when the condition affirms something and the matter is not a khulʿ, with the sole exception of the wording, “You are divorced if you so wish.” Nor do they imply repetition, except for kullamā.

If he says, “When I divorce you, you are divorced and then divorced again,” or suspends the divorce on a description and that description materializes, two divorces take effect. If he states, “Every time my divorce occurs, then divorce,” three divorces fall in the case of a wife with whom he has consummated the marriage, and one in the case of a wife with whom he has not.

Assume he owns four slaves and says, “If I divorce one wife, one slave is free; if I divorce two, two slaves are free; if three, three slaves; and if four, four slaves.” If he then divorces four wives—whether all at once or in sequence—ten slaves are emancipated. If he phrases it with kullamā (“whenever”), fifteen slaves are freed, according to the sounder view.

When he suspends the divorce on the non-performance of an act, the prevailing position is: if the condition is expressed with an followed by a perfect verb, it is deemed not yet operative and the divorce falls only when the act is clearly impossible; if the condition is phrased otherwise, it falls after the lapse of a period in which that act could reasonably be done.

If he says, “You are divorced if you enter,” or “if you do not enter,” pronouncing in with the fatḥa (“an”), the divorce takes effect immediately.

I add: except in contexts outside the technical usage of grammarians, where it is treated as a true suspension according to the sounder opinion. Allah knows best.