until her waiting-period (ʿiddah) finishes, the separation is effected by her apostasy and no payment is due. If she returns to Islam during the ʿiddah, the divorce stands and the agreed compensation must be paid. A brief interruption of speech between offer and acceptance does not invalidate the transaction.

Section

If he says, “You are divorced, and you owe” (or “I have against you”) “such-and-such,” without her having previously asked for a payment, a revocable divorce takes effect whether she accepts or not, and no money is due. Should he afterwards claim, “By that I intended the meaning conveyed by, ‘I divorce you for such-and-such,’” and she believes him, it is treated as that form in the sounder view. If her request for a paid divorce preceded his statement, the separation is final and the specified amount becomes obligatory.

If he says, “You are divorced on condition that I have against you such-and-such,” the dominant opinion equates this with, “I divorce you for such-and-such”; once she accepts, the divorce is final and the money is owed.

If he says, “If you guarantee one thousand for me, you are divorced,” and she immediately furnishes the guarantee, the divorce is effected and the thousand becomes due. If he says, “Whenever you guarantee it, you are divorced,” then whenever she does so the divorce takes effect; should she guarantee less than one thousand, it does not, whereas guaranteeing two thousand does trigger it.

If he authorises her, saying, “Divorce yourself if you guarantee me one thousand,” and she responds, “I have divorced myself and I guarantee,” or she reverses the order of the two statements, the divorce occurs and the thousand is due. If she limits herself to only one of the two, no divorce takes place.

When he suspends the divorce on her payment of a sum, and she sets the money before him, the divorce is effected, and the sounder view is that the money enters his ownership. If he says, “If you make me receive it,” some equate that with simple payment, but the sounder opinion treats it like any other conditional suspension: he does not thereby own it, and receipt need not be in the same sitting.

The author says: In this case the divorce is revocable, and for the condition to be fulfilled he must take the money with his own hand from her, even if she is under duress. Allah knows best.

If he makes the divorce conditional on her giving him a slave described with a specific, lawful attribute, and she gives him a slave lacking that attribute, the divorce does not occur. If she gives one with the attribute but defective, he may return it and she owes a peer-dowry; another opinion entitles him instead to the slave’s full sound value.

If he simply said, “a slave,” the divorce is effected by her handing over any slave—except one that is usurped, according to the stronger view—in which case he is entitled to a peer-dowry.

If he holds only a single pronouncement of divorce and she says, “Divorce me three times for one thousand,” and he uses that single pronouncement, he is entitled to the whole thousand. Another view gives him one-third of it, and yet another conditions the full payment on her being aware of his limited authority.