If he is an unrelated third party, the compensation is payable by him. Should he leave the matter unrestricted, the stronger opinion is that she must pay the amount she herself named, while he is liable for anything in excess. It is permissible for him to appoint as his agent a dhimmī, a slave, or a person placed under interdiction for prodigality, but such an interdicted person may not be appointed to receive the compensation. The sounder view also validates his appointing a woman to effect the khulʿ or pronounce the divorce on his behalf. If both spouses appoint the same man as agent, he may, according to one opinion, represent only one side; another view allows him to act for both sides.

Section

A separation concluded with the word “khulʿ” counts as a divorce; another opinion treats it as an annulment (fasakh) that does not diminish the husband’s quota of divorces. On the first view, the term “fasakh” is a figurative expression, “mufādāʿah” is essentially the same as khulʿ, and the word “khulʿ” itself is explicit—though another opinion regards it as figurative. Accordingly, if a khulʿ is transacted without mention of a consideration, the sounder view is that a peer-dowry becomes due. It may likewise be effected with figurative expressions of divorce, provided the intention is present, and even in a non-Arabic language. If he says, “I sell you yourself for such-and-such,” and she replies, “I have bought,” this is a figurative form of khulʿ.

When he opens with a wording of exchange, such as, “I divorce you” or “I make khulʿ with you for one thousand,” and we hold that khulʿ is a divorce, the contract is one of exchange tinged with conditionality. He may retract it before she accepts, and her acceptance must be expressed without a break from his offer. If offer and acceptance differ—he says, “I divorce you for one thousand” and she accepts for two thousand, or the reverse; or he says, “I divorce you three times for one thousand” and she accepts one divorce for a third of a thousand—the transaction is void. If he says, “I divorce you three times for one thousand,” and she accepts one divorce for the full one thousand, the sounder opinion is that the triple divorce takes effect and the one thousand is due.

If he begins with a suspended formula such as, “Whenever you give me…,” the divorce is suspended; he cannot retract it, and neither a verbal acceptance nor payment in the same sitting is required. The same applies if he says, “If” or “When you give me…,” except that immediate payment is then required.

When she initiates the matter by requesting a divorce and he replies, the arrangement becomes an exchange tinged with a reward contract (juʿālah); she may withdraw before his response, and his response must be immediate. If she asks for three divorces for one thousand and he issues a single divorce for a third of that amount, then one divorce is effected for one-third of the thousand.

Whenever a khulʿ or a divorce is concluded for compensation, there is no right of revocation. If he stipulates a right of return, the divorce is revocable and no compensation is due—though another opinion holds that it is final and that a peer-dowry becomes payable. If she says, “Divorce me for such-and-such,” then apostatizes, and he responds—whether before or after consummation—and she persists