As for the heirs who are actually present, we proceed on the premise least favourable to them.

Should the deceased have left a pregnancy—one that certainly does, or might possibly, inherit—we adopt the most precautionary course both for the unborn child and for the other heirs. If the child is delivered alive within a period that proves it was already in existence when the deceased died, it takes its share; otherwise the matter is left undecided until its status becomes clear. Where no heir exists apart from the pregnancy, or where the fetus might bar another heir, the whole estate is suspended. If the fetus cannot exclude a given heir and that heir enjoys a fixed share, the share is paid—subject to ʿawl (proportional reduction) whenever that is possible. An example is a pregnant widow together with the deceased’s two parents: the widow receives one-eighth, and each parent one-sixth, all liable to ʿawl. But if the co-heirs have no predetermined share, as is the case with children, they are given nothing for the moment. A secondary view holds that a single pregnancy can produce no more than four children, in which case only the portion that is absolutely certain is distributed.

An indeterminate intersex (khunthā mushkil) whose inheritance would not differ—such as a maternal sibling or an emancipator—receives that inheritance in full; otherwise we act on whatever is certain for both the intersex and the other heirs, and the doubtful amount is held in suspension until the matter is resolved. Anyone who combines a cause that yields a fixed share with one that yields residuary succession—such as a husband who is also an emancipator, or a paternal cousin—inherits on both grounds.

I say: if, under a Zoroastrian marriage or a doubtful union, a girl is born who is at once a daughter and a sister, she inherits by virtue of being a daughter—though another opinion allows her to inherit on both grounds. Allah knows best.

If two persons share the same residuary relationship and one of them is linked to the deceased by an additional tie—such as two paternal cousins, one of whom is also a uterine half-brother—then the half-brother receives one-sixth and the remainder is divided between the two. Should a daughter be present as well, she takes one-half and the rest is divided equally between the other two; another opinion assigns that remainder exclusively to the half-brother.

When a single individual combines two grounds that would each confer a fixed share, he inherits only by the stronger of the two. A share is considered stronger if it excludes the other, is itself not liable to exclusion, or is less liable to exclusion.

1. Excluding: a daughter who is also a uterine sister—imagined in the unlikely event that a Zoroastrian, or a Muslim through a doubtful union, has intercourse with his own mother and she bears a girl. Here the daughter’s portion prevails because it bars the uterine sister’s.
2. Not excluded: a mother who is simultaneously a paternal sister—conceived where a man has relations with his own daughter and she gives birth to a girl. The mother’s share prevails because it is never excluded by the sister-relation.
3. Less liable to exclusion: a maternal grandmother who is also a sister—envisaged when that second girl is impregnated by the same man and bears a boy; the first woman is then both the boy’s maternal grandmother and his sister. The grandmother’s title is preferred because it is less vulnerable to being barred.