while for a livestock pen it is enough to fence the area; no roof is required, and the jurists differ over whether a gate must be hung.
If one intends a farm, revival is achieved by heaping earth around the plot, levelling the soil, and arranging a water supply whenever the normal rainfall is insufficient for cultivation—this is the sounder view.
If he wishes to establish an orchard, he must gather earth, fence it where that is customary, secure water, and—according to the school’s authoritative position—actually plant the trees.
Whoever begins the works of revival but does not complete them, or who merely stakes out a tract by setting stones or driving in posts, is deemed a mutaḥajjir—one who has performed tahjīr (delimiting dead land)—and he has priority to that land. The sounder opinion, however, is that he may not sell this right, and that if another person fully revives the land he becomes its owner even after a long interval of tahjīr. The ruler may say to the claimant: “Either revive it or leave it.” Should he ask for time, he may be granted a short respite.
If the imam grants someone an iqṭāʿ (state allotment) of dead land, the grantee enjoys the same priority as a mutaḥajjir; yet the imam should only allot land to a person capable of reviving it and only in an amount he can realistically develop—the same restriction applies to tahjīr itself.
The preferable view is that the imam may declare a portion of dead land a ḥimā (protected reserve) for grazing the livestock taken as jizya, the animals of charity (zakāh), strays, and beasts too weak to roam in search of pasture. He may revoke that protection whenever need arises, but he may not create a ḥimā for his personal benefit.
Section
The primary benefit of a public road is passage. It is permissible to sit there for rest, trade, and similar purposes so long as one does not impede passers-by, and no special licence from the imam is required. A person may shade his spot with a mat or the like.
If two people arrive at the same place simultaneously, lots are drawn; some hold that the imam decides according to his judgment.
Should a man sit there to conduct business and then depart, abandoning the craft or moving elsewhere, his right lapses. If he leaves intending to return, it is not forfeited unless his absence is prolonged to the point that his customers desert him and become accustomed to another vendor.
Anyone who has become known for occupying a spot in the mosque to issue fatwas or teach Qur’an is treated like the trader in the street. One who merely sits there for a particular prayer does not thereby gain priority to the spot for other prayers; yet if he steps away for a need, intending to return, his claim to that place for that very prayer does not lapse—according to the sounder view—even if he leaves no garment behind as a marker.
Likewise, if a man takes the lead in occupying a place within an endowed ribat, a jurist within a madrasa, or a Sufi within a khānqāh, he is not to be dislodged, and his right is not annulled by his stepping out to purchase necessities and the like.